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Abstract
We study coordination mechanisms for Scheduling Games (with unrelated machines). In
these games, each job represents a player, who needs to choose a machine for its execution, and
intends to complete earliest possible. In an egalitarian objective, the social cost would be the
maximal job completion time, i.e. the makespan of the schedule. In an utilitarian objective, the
social cost would be the average completion time. Instead of studying one of those objectives,
we focus on the more general class of `k-norm (for some parameter k) on job completion times
as social cost. This permits to balance overall quality of service and fairness. In this setting, a
coordination mechanism is a fixed policy, which specifies how jobs assigned to a same machine
will be scheduled. This policy is known to the players and influences therefore their behavior.
Our goal is to design scheduling policies that always admit a pure Nash equilibrium and
guarantee a small price of anarchy for the `k-norm social cost. We consider policies with different
amount of knowledge about jobs: non-clairvoyant (not depending on the job processing times),
strongly-local (where the schedule of machine i depends only on processing times for this machine
i and jobs j assigned to i) and local (where the schedule of machine i depends only on processing
times for all machines i′ and jobs j assigned to i). The analysis relies on the smooth argument
together with adequate inequalities, called smooth inequalities. With this unified framework, we
are able to prove the following results.
First, we study the inefficiency in `k-norm social costs of a strongly-local policy SPT that
schedules the jobs non-preemptively in order of increasing processing times and a non-clairvoyant
policy EQUI that schedules the jobs in parallel using time-multiplexing, assigning each job an
equal fraction of CPU time. We show that the price of anarchy of policy SPT is O(k). We
also prove a lower bound of Ω(k/ log k) for all deterministic, non-preemptive, strongly-local and
non-waiting policies (non-waiting policies produce schedules without idle times). These results
ensure that SPT is close to optimal with respect to the class of `k-norm social costs. Moreover,
we prove that the non-clairvoyant policy EQUI has price of anarchy O(2k).
Second, we consider the makespan (`∞-norm) social cost by making connection within the
`k-norm functions. We revisit some local policies and provide simpler, unified proofs from the
framework’s point of view. With the highlight of the approach, we derive a local policy Balance.
This policy guarantees a price of anarchy of O(logm), which makes it the currently best known
policy among the anonymous local policies that always admit a pure Nash equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
With the development of the Internet, large-scale systems consisting of autonomous decision-makers
(players) become more and more important. The rational behavior of players who compete for the
usage of shared resources generally leads to an unstable and inefficient outcome. This creates a
need for resource usage policies that guarantee stable and near-optimal outcomes.
From a game theoretical point of view, stable outcomes are captured by the concept of Nash
equilibria. Formally, in a game with n players, each player j chooses a strategy xj from a set Sj
and this induces a cost cj(x) for player j depending all chosen strategies x. A strategy profile
x = (x1, . . . , xn) is a pure Nash equilibrium if no player can decrease its cost by an unilateral
deviation, i.e., cj(x
′
j , x−j) ≥ cj(x) for every player j and x′j ∈ Sj , where x−j denotes the strategies
selected by players different from j.
The better-response dynamic is the process of repeatedly choosing an arbitrary player that can
improve its cost and let it take a better strategy while other player strategies remain unchanged.
It is desirable that in a game the better-response dynamic converges to a Nash equilibrium as it
is a natural way that selfish behavior leads the game to a stable outcome. A potential game is a
game in which for any instance, the better-response dynamic always converges [9].
A standard measure of inefficiency is the price of anarchy (PoA). Given a game with an objective
function and a notion of equilibrium (e.g pure Nash equilibrium), the PoA of the game is defined
as the ratio between the largest cost of an equilibrium and the cost of an optimal profile, which is
not necessarily an equilibrium. The PoA captures the worst-case paradigm and it guarantees the
efficiency of every equilibrium.
The social cost of a game is an objective function measuring the quality of strategy profiles. In
the literature there are two main extensively-studied objective functions: (i) the utilitarian social
cost is the total individual costs; while (ii) the egalitarian social cost is the maximum individual
cost. The two objective functions are included in a general class of social costs: the class of `k
norms of the individual costs, with utilitarian and the egalitarian social costs corresponding to the
cases k = 1 and k =∞, respectively. There is a need to design policies that guarantee the efficiency
(e.g the PoA) of games under some specific objective function. Moreover, it would be interesting
to come up with a policy, that would be efficient for every social costs from this class.
1.1 Coordination Mechanisms in Scheduling Games
In a scheduling game, there are n jobs and m unrelated machines. Each job needs to be scheduled
on exactly one machine. We consider the unrelated parallel machine model, where each machine
could be specialized for a different type of jobs. In this general setting, the processing time of
job j on machine i is some given arbitrary value pij > 0. A strategy profile x = (x1, . . . , xn) is an
assignment of jobs to machines, where xj denotes the machine (strategy) of job j in the profile. The
cost cj of a job j is its completion time and every job strategically chooses a machine to minimize
the cost. In the game, we consider the social cost as the `k-norm of the individual costs. The social
cost of profile x is C(x) =
(∑
j c
k
j
)1/k
.
The traditional `1, `∞-norms represent the total completion time and the makespan, respec-
tively. Both objectives are natural. Minimizing the total completion time guarantees a quality of
service while minimizing the makespan ensures the fairness of schedule. Unfortunately, in practice
schedules which optimize the total completion time are not implemented due to a lack of fairness
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and vice versa. Implementing a fair schedule is one of the highest priorities in most systems [16].
A popular and practical method to enforce the fairness of a schedule is to optimize the `k-norm of
completion times for some fixed k, which usually is chosen as k small constant. By optimizing the
`k-norm of completion time, one balances overall quality of service and fairness, which is generally
desirable. So the system takes into account a trade-off between quality of service and fairness by
optimizing the `k-norm of completion time [14, 16].
A coordination mechanism is a set of scheduling policies, one for each machine, that determine
how to schedule the jobs assigned to a machine. The idea is to connect the individual cost to
the social cost, in such a way that the selfishness of the agents will lead to equilibria with small
social cost. We distinguish between local, strongly-local and non-clairvoyant policies. These policies
are classified in the decreasing order of the amount of information that ones could use for their
decisions. Formally, let x = (x1, . . . , xn) be a profile.
• A policy is local if the scheduling of jobs on machine i depends only on the processing times
of jobs assigned to the machine, i.e., {pi′j : xj = i, 1 ≤ i′ ≤ m}.
• A policy is strongly-local if the policy of machine i depends only on the processing times for
this machine i for all jobs assigned to i, i.e., {pij : xj = i}.
• A policy is non-clairvoyant if the scheduling of jobs on machine i does not depend on any
processing time. Such a policy actually assigns CPU time slots to jobs, and is informed
whenever some job completes. The resulting schedule then reflects the processing times of its
jobs, even though the policy is not aware of them prior to the job completions.
In addition, a policy is anonymous if it does not use any global ordering of jobs or any global job
identities. Note that for any deterministic policy, local job identities are necessary as a machine
may need such information in order to break ties (a job may have different identities on different
machines). Moreover, we call a policy non-waiting if the schedule contains no idle time between
job executions.
Instead of specifying the actual schedule, we rather describe a scheduling policy as a function,
mapping every job j to some completion time cj(x). Such a policy is said feasible if for any profile
x, there exists a schedule where job j completes at time cj(x). Formally, for any job j, we must
have cj(x) ≥
∑
j′ pij′ where the sum is take over all jobs j
′ with xj = xj′ , and cj′(x) ≤ cj(x).
Certainly, any designed deterministic policy needs to be feasible.
1.2 Overview & Contributions
Recently, Roughgarden [12] developed the smoothness argument, a unifying method to show upper
bounds the PoA for utilitarian games. This canonical method is elegant in its simplicity and its
power. Here we give a brief description of this argument.
A cost-minimization game with the total cost objective C(x) =
∑
j cj(x) is (λ, µ)-smooth if for
every profile x and x∗, ∑
j
cj(x
∗
j , x−j) ≤ µ
∑
j
cj(x) + λ
∑
j
cj(x
∗)
The smooth argument [12] states that the robust price of anarchy (including the PoA of pure,
mixed, correlated equilibria, etc) of a cost-minimization game is bounded by
inf
{
λ
1− µ : λ ≥ 0, µ < 1, the game is (λ, µ)-smooth
}
.
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We will make use of this argument to settle the equilibrium inefficiency in scheduling games. We
will prove the robust PoA by applying the smooth argument to the game with Ck(x) =
∑
j c
k
j (x)
where C(x) is the `k-norm social cost of Scheduling Games. The main difficulty in applying the
smooth argument to Scheduling Games has arisen from the fact that jobs on the same machine
have different costs, which is in contrast to Congestion Games where players incurs the same cost
at the same resource. The key technique in this paper is a system of inequalities, called smooth
inequalities, that are useful to prove the smoothness of the game. With the inequalities, we are
able to analyze systematically and in unified manner the PoA of the game under different policies.
Our contributions are the following:
1. We study the equilibrium inefficiency for the `k-norm objective function. We consider a non-
clairvoyant policy EQUI that schedules the jobs in parallel using time-multiplexing, assigning
each job an equal fraction of CPU time; and a strongly-local policy SPT that schedules the jobs
non-preemptively in order of increasing processing times (with a deterministic tie-breaking
rule for each machine)1. We prove that the PoA of the game under the non-clairvoyant policy
EQUI is at most O(2k). Besides, the PoA of the game under the deterministic strongly-
local policy SPT is at most O(k). Moreover, any deterministic non-preemptive, non-waiting
and strongly-local policy has a PoA at least Ω(k/ log k), which is close to the PoA of the
game under the SPT policy. Hence, for any `k-norm social cost, SPT is close to optimal
among deterministic non-preemptive, non-waiting, strongly-local policy. (The cases k = 1
and k =∞ are confirmed in [6] and [1, 8], respectively.) If one considers theoretical evidence
to classify algorithms for practical use then SPT is a good candidate due to its simplicity and
theoretically guaranteed performance on any combination of the quality and the fairness of
schedules.
2. We study the equilibrium inefficiency for the makespan objective function (e.g., `∞-norm)
for local policies by making connection between `k-norm functions. First, we revisit policies
BCOORD, CCOORD introduced in [3]. We give unified and simpler proofs based on the smooth
arguments. With the highlight of this approach, we derive a new policy Balance (definition is
given is Section 4). The game under that policy always admits Nash equilibrium and induces
the PoA of O(logm) — the currently best performance among anonymous local policies that
always possess pure Nash equilibria.
Objective Policy Pure Nash equilibria PoA
`k-norm EQUI (non-clairvoyant) potential game O(2
k)
SPT (strongly-local) potential game O(k)
`∞-norm Balance (local) potential game O(logm)
Figure 1: Main contributions of the paper.
Our results naturally extend to the case when jobs have weights and the objective is the weighted
`k-norm of completion times, i.e., (
∑
j(wjcj(x))
k)1/k.
1Formal definitions of EQUI and SPT are given in Section 3
4
1.3 Related results
The smooth argument has been formalized in [12]. It has been used to establish tight PoA of
congestion games [11], a fundamental class of games. The argument is also applied to prove bounds
on the PoA of weighted congestion games [2]. Subsequently, Roughgarden and Schoppmann [13]
have extended the argument to prove tight bounds on the PoA of atomic splittable congestion
games for a large class of latencies.
Coordination mechanisms for scheduling games was introduced in [4] where the makespan (`∞-
norm) objective was considered. For the non-clairvoyant policies, Cohen et al. [5] studied the
game under various policies and derived the policy EQUI that always admits a Nash equilibrium
and has an optimal PoA. For strongly-local policies, Immorlica et al. [8] gave a survey on the
existence and inefficiency of different policies such as SPT, LPT, RANDOM. Some tight bounds on
the PoA under different policies were given. Azar et al. [1] initiated the study on local policies.
They designed a non-preemptive policy with PoA of O(logm) and a preemptive policy that always
admits an equilibrium and guarantees a PoA of O(log2m). Subsequently, Caragiannis [3] derived a
non-anonymous local policy ACOORD and anonymous local policies BCOORD and CCOORD with
PoA of O(logm), O(logm/ log logm) and O(log2m), respectively where the first and the last ones
always admit a Nash equilibrium. Fleischer and Svitkina [7] showed a lower bound of Ω(logm) for
all deterministic non-preemptive, non-waiting local policies.
Recently, Cole et al. [6] studied the game with total completion time (`1-norm) objective. They
considered strongly-local policies with weighted jobs, and derived a non-preemptive policy inspired
by the Smith’s rule which has PoA = 4. This bound is tight for deterministic non-preemptive non-
waiting strongly-local policies. Moreover, some preemptive policies are also designed with better
performance guarantee.
1.4 Organization
In Section 2, we state some smooth inequalities that will be used in settling the PoA for different
policies. In Section 3, we study the scheduling game with the `k-norm social cost. We define
the policies SPT and EQUI, and prove their inefficiency. We also provide an lower bound on
the PoA for any deterministic non-preemptive non-waiting strongly-local policy. In Section 4, we
consider the makespan (`∞-norm) social cost for local policies. We revisit the policies BCOORD
and CCOORD [3]; define and analyze the performance of policy Balance. The proofs of all lemmas
and theorems are either presented in the main corp of the paper or given in the appendix.
2 Smooth Inequalities
In this section, we show various inequalities that are useful for the analysis. Specifically, Lemma 2.3
and Lemma 2.4 are applied directly to prove the PoA of policies SPT and EQUI, respectively in
Section 3. The other lemmas are used to prove Lemma 2.3, Lemma 2.4 and theorems in Section 4.
First, we give a definition of Lambert W function that we use throughout the paper. For each
y ∈ R+, W (y) is defined to be solution of the equation xex = y. Note that, xex is increasing with
respect to x, hence W (·) is increasing.
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Lemma 2.1 Let k be a positive integer. Let 0 < a(k) ≤ 1 be a function on k. Then, for any
x, y > 0, it holds that
y(x+ y)k ≤ k
k + 1
a(k)xk+1 + b(k)yk+1
where α is some constant and
b(k) =

Θ
(
αk ·
(
k
log ka(k)
)k−1)
if limk→∞(k − 1)a(k) =∞, (1a)
Θ
(
αk · kk−1
)
if (k − 1)a(k) are bounded ∀k, (1b)
Θ
(
αk · 1
ka(k)k
)
if limk→∞(k − 1)a(k) = 0. (1c)
Proof Let f(z) := kk+1a(k)z
k+1 − (1 + z)k + b(k). To show the claim, we equivalently prove that
f(z) ≥ 0 for all z > 0.
We have f ′(z) = ka(k)zk − k(1 + z)k−1. Let z0 be the unique positive root of f ′(z) = 0.
Function f is decreasing in (0, z0) and increasing in (z0,+∞), so f(z) ≥ f(z0) for all z > 0. Hence,
by choosing
b(k) =
∣∣∣ k
k + 1
a(k)zk+10 − (1 + z0)k
∣∣∣ = (1 + z0)k−1(1 + z0
k + 1
)
it follows that f(z) ≥ 0 ∀z > 0.
We study the positive root z0 of equation
a(k)zk − (1 + z)k−1 = 0 (2)
Note that f ′(1) = a(k)− 2k−1 < 0 since 0 < a(k) ≤ 1. Thus, z0 > 1. For the sake of simplicity, we
define the function g(k) such that z0 =
k−1
g(k) where 0 < g(k) < k − 1. Equation (2) is equivalent to(
1 +
g(k)
k − 1
)k−1
g(k) = (k − 1)a(k)
Note that ew/2 < 1 +w < ew for w ∈ (0, 1). For w := g(k)k−1 , we obtain the following upper and lower
bounds for the term (k − 1)a(k):
eg(k)/2g(k) < (k − 1)a(k) < eg(k)g(k) (3)
By definition of the Lambert W function and Equation (3), we get that
W ((k − 1)a(k)) < g(k) < 2W
(
(k − 1)a(k)
2
)
(4)
First, consider the case where limk→∞(k − 1)a(k) =∞. The asymptotic sequence for W (x) as
x → +∞ is the following: W (x) = lnx − ln lnx + ln lnxlnx + O
((
ln lnx
lnx
)2)
. So, for large enough k,
W ((k−1)a(k)) = Θ(log((k−1)a(k))). Since z0 = k−1g(k) , from Equation (4), we get z0 = Θ
(
k
log(ka(k))
)
.
This guarantees f(z0) ≥ 0 and b(k) = Θ
(
αk ·
(
k
log ka(k)
)k−1)
for some constant α.
6
Second, consider the case where (k − 1)a(k) is bounded by some constants. So by (4), we have
g(k) = Θ(1). Therefore z0 = Θ(k). Which again implies f(z0) ≥ 0 and b(k) = Θ
(
αk · kk−1) for
some constant α.
Third, we consider the case where limk→∞(k − 1)a(k) = 0. We focus on the Taylor series W0
of W around 0. It can be found using the Lagrange inversion and is given by
W0(x) =
∞∑
i=1
(−i)i−1
i!
xi = x− x2 +O(1)x3.
Thus, for k large enough g(k) = Θ((k − 1)a(k)). Hence, z0 = Θ(1/a(k)). Once again this implies
f(z0) ≥ 0 and b(k) = Θ
(
αk · 1
ka(k)k
)
for some constant α. 
Note that the case (1a) of Lemma 2.1 could be used to settle the tight bound on the PoA of
Congestion Games in which delay functions are polynomials with positive coefficients. [15] proved
this case for a(k) = 1 and b(k) = Θ( 1k (k/ log k)
k) in order to upper bound of the PoA in Selfish
Load Balancing Games.
Lemma 2.2 It holds that (k + 1)z ≥ 1− (1− z)k+1 for all 0 ≤ z ≤ 1 and for all k ≥ 0.
Proof Consider f(z) = (k + 1)z − 1 + (1 − z)k+1 for 0 ≤ z ≤ 1. We have f ′(z) = (k + 1) − (k +
1)(1− z)k ≥ 0 ∀0 ≤ z ≤ 1. So f(z) ≥ f(0) = 0. Thus, (k + 1)z ≥ 1− (1− z)k+1 for all 0 ≤ z ≤ 1.

In the following, we prove inequalities to bound the PoA of the scheduling game. Remark that
until the end of the section, we use i, j as the indices. The following is the main lemma to show
the upper bound O(k) of the PoA under policy SPT in the next section.
Lemma 2.3 For any non-negative sequences (ni)
P
i=1, (mi)
P
i=1, and for any positive increasing se-
quence (qi)
P
i=1, define Ai,j := n1q1 + . . . + ni−1qi−1 + j · qi for 1 ≤ i ≤ P, 1 ≤ j ≤ ni and
Bi,j := m1q1 + . . .+mi−1qi−1 + j · qi for 1 ≤ i ≤ P, 1 ≤ j ≤ mi. Then, it holds that
P∑
i=1
mi∑
j=1
(Ai,ni + j · qi)k ≤ µk
P∑
i=1
ni∑
j=1
Aki,j + λk
P∑
i=1
mi∑
j=1
Bki,j ,
where µk =
k+1
k+2 and λk = Θ(α
k(k + 1)k) for some constant α.
Proof Denote ri = 1/qi for 1 ≤ i ≤ P . The inequality is equivalent to
P∑
i=1
ri
mi∑
j=1
qi(Ai,ni + j · qi)k ≤ µk
P∑
i=1
ri
ni∑
j=1
qiA
k
i,j + λk
P∑
i=1
ri
mi∑
j=1
qiB
k
i,j
For convenience set rP+1 = 0. This inequality could be written as
P∑
i=1
(ri − ri+1)
 i∑
t=1
mt∑
j=1
qt(At,nt + j · qt)k

≤
P∑
i=1
(ri − ri+1)
µk i∑
t=1
nt∑
j=1
qtA
k
t,j + λk
i∑
t=1
mt∑
j=1
qtA
k
t,j

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As (ri)
P
i=1 is decreasing a sequence (so ri − ri+1 ≥ 0 ∀1 ≤ i ≤ P ), it is sufficient to prove that
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ P ,
i∑
t=1
mt∑
j=1
qt(At,nt + j · qt)k ≤ µk
i∑
t=1
nt∑
j=1
qtA
k
t,j + λk
i∑
t=1
mt∑
j=1
qtA
k
t,j . (5)
It remains to show Inequality (5).
For convenience set A0,j = 0 for any j. By Lemma 2.2, we have
(k + 1)qtA
k
t,j ≥ Ak+1t,j − (At,j − qt)k+1 = Ak+1t,j −Ak+1t,j−1 ∀1 ≤ t ≤ P, 2 ≤ j ≤ nt
(k + 1)qtA
k
t,1 ≥ Ak+1t,1 − (At,1 − qt)k+1 = Ak+1t,1 −Ak+1t−1,nt−1 ∀1 ≤ t ≤ P.
Therefore,
(k + 1)
i∑
t=1
nt∑
j=1
qtA
k
t,j ≥
i∑
t=1
 nt∑
j=2
(
Ak+1t,j −Ak+1t,j−1
)
+Ak+1t,1 −Ak+1t−1,nt−1
 = Ak+1i,ni ,
since the sums telescope. Similarly, (k + 1)
∑i
t=1
∑mt
j=1 qtB
k
t,j ≥ Bk+1i,mi . Thus, to prove Inequality
(5), it is sufficient to prove that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ P ,
i∑
t=1
mt∑
j=1
qt(At,nt + j · qt)k ≤
(
µk
k + 1
Ak+1i,ni +
λk
k + 1
Bk+1i,mi
)
Besides,
i∑
t=1
mt∑
j=1
qt(At,nt + j · qt)k ≤
i∑
t=1
mtqt(At,nt +Bi,mi)
k ≤ Bi,mi(Ai,ni +Bi,mi)k
Hence, we only need to argue that
Bi,mi(Ai,ni +Bi,mi)
k ≤
(
µk
k + 1
Ak+1i,ni +
λk
k + 1
Bk+1i,mi
)
(6)
Choose µk =
k+1
k+2 and apply case (1b) of Lemma 2.1 (now a(k) =
(k+1)
k(k+2) and (k − 1)a(k) is
bounded by a constant), we deduce that: for λk = Θ(α
k(k+1)k) where α is a constant, Inequality (6)
holds. 
The following is the main lemma to settle the bound O(2k) of the PoA under policy EQUI (the
proof is in the appendix).
Lemma 2.4 For any non-negative sequences (ni)
P
i=1, (mi)
P
i=1, and for any positive increasing se-
quence (qi)
P
i=1, define Ai = n1q1+ . . .+ni−1qi−1+(ni+ . . .+nP )qi and Bi = m1q1+ . . .+mi−1qi−1+
(mi + . . .+mP )qi for 1 ≤ i ≤ P . Then, it holds that
P∑
i=1
mi(Ai +miqi)
k ≤ µk
P∑
i=1
niA
k
i + λk
P∑
i=1
miB
k
i
where µk =
k+1
k+2 , λk = Θ(α
k2(k+1)
2
) for some constant α.
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3 `k-norms of Completion Times
We study coordination mechanisms under two policies: (1) the strongly-local policy SPT that
schedules jobs in increasing order of processing times; and (2) the non-clairvoyant policy EQUI that
schedules the jobs in parallel using time-multiplexing, assigning each job an equal fraction of CPU
time.
Policy SPT Let x be a strategy profile. Let ≺i be an order of jobs on machine i, where j′ ≺i j
iff pij′ < pij or pij′ = pij and j is priority over j
′ (machine i chooses a local preference over jobs
based on their local identities to break ties). The cost of job j under the SPT [8] policy is
cj(x) =
∑
j′: xj′=i
j′j
pij′ .
Policy EQUI Let x be a strategy profile. The cost of job j under the EQUI policy [5] is
cj(x) =
∑
j′: xj′=i
pij′<pij
pij′ +
∑
j′: xj′=i
pij′≥pij
pij =
∑
j′: xj′=i
min{pij′ , pij}
Note that the two policies SPT and EQUI are feasible. Since all pij could be written as a multiple
of  (a small precision) without loss of generality, assume that all jobs processing times (scaling by
−1) are integers and upper-bounded by P .
Relationship between SPT and EQUI
Lemma 3.1 For any A ≥ 0, p > 0 and k,N integer, it holds that
(k + 1)
N∑
t=1
(A+ tp)k ≥ N(A+Np)k
Lemma 3.2 Let x be an assignment of jobs to machines. Then, the SPT policy minimizes the `k-
norm of job completion times with respect to this assignment among all feasible policies. Moreover,
the EQUI policy induces an objective value at most (2k + 2)1/k times higher.
3.1 Upper bounds of the PoA induced by SPT and EQUI
Theorem 3.1 The PoA of SPT with respect to the `k-norm of job completion times is O(k).
Proof Let x and x∗ be two arbitrary profiles. We focus on a machine i. Let n1, . . . , nP be
the numbers of jobs in x which are assigned to machine i and have processing times 1, . . . , P ,
respectively. Similarly, m1, . . . ,mP are defined for profile x
∗. Note that na and ma are non-
negative for 1 ≤ a ≤ P . Applying Lemma 2.3 for non-negative sequences (na)Pa=1, (ma)Pa=1 and the
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positive increasing sequence (a)Pa=1, we have:
P∑
a=1
( a∑
b=1
bnb + a
)k
+
(
a∑
b=1
bnb + 2a
)k
+ . . .+
(
a∑
b=1
bnb +ma · a
)k
≤ k + 1
k + 2
·
P∑
a=1
(a−1∑
b=1
bnb + a
)k
+
(
a−1∑
b=1
bnb + 2a
)k
+ . . .+
(
a−1∑
b=1
bnb + na · a
)k+
+ Θ
(
αk(k + 1)k
)
·
(a−1∑
b=1
bmb + a
)k
+
(
a−1∑
b=1
bmb + 2a
)k
+ . . .+
(
a−1∑
b=1
bmb +ma · a
)k
where α is a constant.
Observe that, by definition of the cost under the SPT policy (see page 9), the left-hand side (of
the inequality above) is an upper bound for
∑
j:x∗j=i
ckj (x−j , x
∗
j ), while the right-hand side is exactly
k+1
k+2 ·
∑
j:xj=i
ckj (x) + Θ
(
αk(k + 1)k
) ·∑j:x∗j=i ckj (x∗). Thus,∑
j:x∗j=i
ckj (x−j , x
∗
j ) ≤
k + 1
k + 2
·
∑
j:xj=i
ckj (x) + Θ
(
αk(k + 1)k
)
·
∑
j:x∗j=i
ckj (x
∗)
As the inequality above holds for every machine i, summing over all machines we have:∑
j
ckj (x−j , x
∗
j ) ≤
k + 1
k + 2
·
∑
j
ckj (x) + Θ
(
αk(k + 1)k
)
·
∑
j
ckj (x
∗)
By the smooth argument, Ck(x) ≤ (αk(k + 1)k+1)Ck(x∗), i.e., C(x) ≤ O(k)C(x∗). Moreover, by
Lemma 3.2, the optimal schedule for any assignment could be done using the SPT policy. Therefore,
the PoA is O(k). 
Theorem 3.2 The PoA of EQUI with respect to the `k-norm of job completion times is O(2
k).
Proof Let x and x∗ be two arbitrary profiles. We focus on a fixed machine i. Let n1, . . . , nP be the
numbers of jobs in x which are assigned to machine i and have processing times 1, . . . , P respectively.
Similarly, m1, . . . ,mP are defined for profile x
∗ and machine i. Remark that na and ma are non-
negative for 1 ≤ a ≤ P . By definition of cost under policy EQUI (see page 9), the cost of job j
assigned to machine i in profile x can also express as cj(x) =
∑pi,j
b=1 bnb+pi,j
∑P
b=pi,j+1
nb. Applying
Lemma 2.4 for non-negative sequences (na)
P
a=1, (ma)
P
a=1 and the positive increasing sequence (a)
P
a=1,
we have:
P∑
a=1
ma
(
a∑
b=1
bnb + a ·
P∑
b=a+1
nb + ama
)k
≤ k + 1
k + 2
·
P∑
a=1
na
(
a∑
b=1
bnb + a
P∑
b=a+1
nb
)k
+ Θ
(
αk2(k+1)
2
)
·
P∑
a=1
ma
(
a∑
b=1
bmb + a
P∑
b=a+1
mb
)k
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where α is a constant. Therefore, we deduce that∑
j:x∗j=i
ckj (x−j , x
∗
j ) ≤
k + 1
k + 2
·
∑
j:xj=i
ckj (x) + Θ
(
αk2(k+1)
2
)
·
∑
j:x∗j=i
ckj (x
∗)
As the inequality above holds for every machine i, summing over all machines we have:∑
j
ckj (x−j , x
∗
j ) ≤
k + 1
k + 2
·
∑
j
ckj (x) + Θ
(
αk2(k+1)
2
)
·
∑
j
ckj (x
∗)
By smooth argument, Ck(x) ≤ O
(
αk(k + 2)2(k+1)
2
)
Ck(x∗), i.e., C(x) ≤ O(2k+1)C(x∗). More-
over, by Lemma 3.2, for any assignment profile the EQUI policy induces social cost within (2k+2)1/k
times the optimal schedule on the assignment according to the `k-norm. Hence, the PoA is
O((2k + 2)1/k2k+1) = O(2k). 
3.2 Lower bounds of the PoA
Lemma 3.3 The PoA of EQUI with respect to the `k-norm of job completion times is Ω(k/ log k).
Proof The construction is the same as in [5]. Let m be an integer. Define nj :=
2(m−1)!
(j−1)! for 1 ≤
j ≤ m and n := ∑mj=1 nj . We consider the set of m machines and m groups of jobs J1, J2, . . . , Jm.
In group Jj (1 ≤ j ≤ m− 1), there are nj jobs that can be scheduled on machine j or j + 1. Each
job in group Jj (1 ≤ j ≤ m − 1) has processing time pjj = (j−1)!(m−1)! = 2nj on machine j and has
processing time pj+1,j =
j!
2(m−1)! =
1
nj+1
on machine j + 1. The last group (Jm) which has a single
job that can be only scheduled on machine m. This job has processing time pmm = 1 on machine
m.
Consider the strategy profile x in which half of the jobs in Jj (1 ≤ j ≤ m− 1) are scheduled on
machine j and the other half are scheduled on machine j+1 (the job in Jm are scheduled on machine
m). This strategy profile is a strong Nash equilibrium (see [5] for the proof). Observe that the cost
of jobs in group Jj for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m are the same and equals nj−12 pj,j−1 +
nj
2 pjj =
j−1
2 + 1 =
j+1
2 .
Hence, the social cost C(x) satisfies
Ck(x) =
m∑
j=1
njc
k
j =
m∑
j=1
2(m− 1)!
(j − 1)! ·
(
j + 1
2
)k
>
(m− 1)!
2k−1
m∑
j=0
jk
j!
Let Bk is the k
th Bell number. Remark that Bk = Θ
(
(k/ log k)k
)
. By a property of Bell
polynomial [10, page 66], eBk =
∑∞
j=0
jk
j! (Dobin´ski’s formula). Hence for m large enough, we have
Ck(x) >
(m− 1)!
2k−1
Bk
Consider a profile x∗ in which jobs in group Jj (1 ≤ j ≤ m) are assigned to machine j. In this
profile, every job has cost 2 except the job in Jm with cost 1. Thus, the social cost C(x
∗) satisfies
Ck(x∗) = 1 +
m−1∑
j=1
nj2
k < 2k
m∑
j=1
2(m− 1)!
j!
< e2k+1(m− 1)!
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Therefore, the PoA is at least
(
Bk
e·4k
)1/k
= Ω(k/ log k). 
Theorem 3.3 The PoA of any deterministic non-preemptive non-waiting strongly-local policy is
Ω(k/ log k) with respect to the `k-norm of job completion times.
Proof Using the technique described in [6], it is sufficient to prove that the PoA of SPT is
Ω(k/ log k). Consider the same construction in Lemma 3.3. The only difference is that now we
partition each group Jj into J
1
j ∪ J2j where |J1j | = |J2j | = nj/2. In machine j, jobs in sub-group J1j
have higher priority in than the ones in J2j . Inversely, in machine j + 1, jobs in sub-group J
1
j have
higher priority in than the ones in J2j .
Consider the profile in which jobs in J1j and J
2
j (1 ≤ j ≤ m − 1) are assigned to machine j
and j + 1 respectively (the job in Jm is assigned to machine m). By the definition of priority
and Lemma 3.3, this profile is an equilibrium (under SPT). Besides, by Lemma 3.2, the social cost
of this profile under SPT is within (2k + 2)1/k-fraction of that induced by EQUI. Notice that the
optimal social cost under SPT is always upper-bounded by that under EQUI. Therefore, the PoA
of SPT is Ω((2k + 2)−1/k · k/ log k) = Ω(k/ log k). 
4 `∞-norms of Completion Times
We consider local policies for the makespan social cost. First, we revisit the policies BCOORD and
CCOORD in [3] by giving simpler proofs in a unified manner that is based on the smooth argument
and the smooth inequalities. With the highlight of this approach, we derive a policy Balance that
gives the currently best performance among anonymous local policies which always admits a Nash
equilibrium.
For any profile x, the social cost C(x) = maxj cj . Let x(i) = {j : xj = i} be the set of
jobs assigned to machine i. Define L(x(i)) :=
∑
j:xj=i
pij , L(x) := maxi L(x(i)) for all machines
1 ≤ i ≤ m. Note that in an optimal assignment x∗, C(x∗) = L(x∗). For each job j, denote
qj := min{pij : 1 ≤ i ≤ m} and define ρij := pij/qj for all i, j. Moreover the following lemma
guarantees that the restriction to m-efficient assignment is as efficient as in the case up to a
constant.
Lemma 4.1 ([3]) Let y∗ be an optimal assignment. Then, there exits a m-efficient assignment
x∗ such that L(x∗) ≤ 2L(y∗).
4.1 Policy BCOORD, Revisited
Let k be a positive integer. Under policy BCOORD [3], in profile x in which job j chooses machine
i, the completion time cj of j equals ρ
1/k
ij L(x(i)) if ρij ≤ m and equals ∞ otherwise. As ρij ≥ 1,
cj ≥ L(x(i)) for all jobs j assigned to machine i. So, the schedule of such jobs is feasible. Note
that the game under the policy does not always possess a Nash equilibrium [3].
Lemma 4.2 Let x and x∗ be an equilibrium and an arbitrary m-efficient profile, respectively. Then,
it holds that
∑
i
∑
j:xj=i
qjc
k
j (x) ≤ O
(
kαk
(
k
log k
)k−1)∑
i
∑
j:x∗j=i
qjc
k
j (x
∗) where α is a constant.
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Theorem 4.1 ([3]) The PoA of the game under policy BCOORD is O
(
logm
log logm
)
by choosing k =
logm.
4.2 Policy CCOORD, Revisited
For any integer k and any non-empty set A = {a1, . . . , an} of non-negative reals. The function Ψk
is defined as the following
Ψk(A) = k!
∑
1≤d1≤...≤dk≤n
k∏
t=1
adt
By an abuse of notation, we define L(A) =
∑n
i=1 ai. Note that Ψ1(A) = L(A). Under policy
CCOORD [3], in profile x in which job j chooses machine i, the completion time cj of j equals
(ρijΨk(x(i)))
1/k if ρij ≤ m and equals ∞ otherwise. The game under policy CCOORD always
admits a Nash equilibrium [3].
Lemma 4.3 Let x be a Nash equilibrium. Then, for any m-efficient profile x∗, it holds that∑
i
∑
j:xj=i
qjc
k
j (x) ≤ 2k+1(k + 1)k+2
∑
i
∑
j:x∗j=i
qjc
k
j (x
∗)
Theorem 4.2 ([3]) The PoA of the game under policy CCOORD is O(log2m) by choosing k =
logm.
4.3 Policy Balance
Let x be a strategy profile. Let ≺i be a total order on the jobs assigned to machine i. Formally,
j ≺i j′ if pij < pij′ , or pij = pij′ and j is priority over j′ (machine i chooses a local preference over
jobs based on their local identities to break ties). Note that the policy does not need a global job
identities (there is no communication cost between machines about job identities) and a job may
have different priority on different machines. The policy is clearly anonymous.
The cost cj of job j assigned to machine i is defined as follows.
ckj (x) =

1
qj
[(
pij +
∑
j′:j′≺ij
xj′=i
pij′
)k+1 − ( ∑
j′:j′≺ij
xj′=i
pij′
)k+1]
if ρij ≤ m,
∞ otherwise.
Observe that the cost cj(x) of job j satisfies
ckj (x) ≥
1
qj
(pij + ∑
j′:j′≺ij, xj′=i
pij′
)k+1 − ( ∑
j′:j′≺ij, xj′=i
pij′
)k+1
≥ pij
qj
(
pij +
∑
j′:j′≺ij, xj′=i
pij′
)k ≥ (pij + ∑
j′:j′≺ij, xj′=i
pij′
)k
since pij/qj ≥ 1. As that holds for every job j assigned to machine i, policy Balance is feasible.
Remark that even there is some similarity in the definition of Balance and policy ACCORD [3],
the latter is not anonymous. ACCORD uses a global job ordering in its definition and it makes use
this order to prove the existence and inefficiency of Nash equilibria whereas Balance uses only local
job identities in case of tie break (that is unavoidable for any policy).
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Lemma 4.4 The best-response dynamic under the Balance policy converges to a Nash equilibrium.
Proof By the definition of the policy, any job j will choose a machine i such that ρij ≤ m.
Moreover, since qj is fixed for each job j, the behavior of jobs is similar to that in the game in
which the set of strategy of a player j is the same as in the former except for machines i with
ρij > m. Moreover, in the new game, player j in profile x has cost c
′
j(x) such that(
c′j(x)
)k
=
(
pij +
∑
j′≺ij
pij′
)k+1 − ( ∑
j′≺ij
pij′
)k+1
Hence, it is sufficient to prove that the better-response dynamic in the new game always converges.
The argument is the same as the one to prove the existence of Nash equilibrium for policy SPT [8].
Here we present a proof based on a geometrical approach.
First, define posi(j) := 1 + |{j′ : j′ ≺i j, 1 ≤ j′ 6= j ≤ n}| which represents the priority of job j
on machine i. For a value u ∈ R+ and a job index 1 ≤ t ≤ n, we associate to every profile x the
quantity
|x|u,t := |{j : c′j(x) < u or c′j(x) = u, posxj (j) ≤ t}|.
We use it to define a partial order ≺ on profiles. Formally x ≺ y if for the lexicographically smallest
pair (u, t) such that |x|u,t 6= |y|u,t we have |x|u,t < |y|u,t.
t
u
Figure 2: An geometrical illustration of |x|u,t, every dot is a (j, cj(x)) pair, colored black if counted
in |x|u,t.
We show that the profile strictly increases according to this order, whenever a job changes to
another machine while decreasing its cost. Let j be such a job changing from machine a in profile
x to machine b, resulting in a profile y. We know that c′j(y) < c
′
j(x). Remark that only jobs j
′
with xj′ = b might have the cost in y larger than that in x (by definition of the cost c
′). Moreover,
such job j′ with xj′ = b and j′ has a different costs in x and y, it must be j ≺b j′, which also
implies c′j′(x) ≥ c′j(y). In the same spirit, some jobs j′ with xj′ = a might decrease their cost, but
not below c′j(x).
Consider u = c′j(y) and t = posb(j). We have that |x|u′,t′ = |y|u′,t′ for all u′ < u and all t′. If
job j is the only job with processing time pbj among the ones {j′ : xj′ = b}, then |y|u,t = |x|u,t + 1.
Otherwise, |y|u,t′ = |x|u,t′ for t′ < t and |y|u,t = |x|u,t + 1.
Therefore (u, t) is the first lexicographical pair where |x|u,t 6= |y|u,t and |y|u,t > |x|u,t. Hence,
since the set of strategy profiles is finite, the better-response dynamic must converge to a pure Nash
equilibrium. This completes the proof. 
Remark that the game under Balance convergences fast to Nash equilibria in the best-response
dynamic (the argument is the same as [8, Theorem 12]).
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Lemma 4.5 Let x and x∗ be an equilibrium and an m-efficient arbitrary profile, respectively. Then,∑m
i=1 L
k+1(x(i)) ≤ O(αkkk+1)∑mi=1 Lk+1(x∗(i)) where α is some constant.
Proof We focus on an arbitrary job j. Denote i = xj and i
∗ = x∗j . As x is an equilibrium, we have
ckj (x) ≤ ckj (x−j , x∗j ), i.e,(
pij +
∑
j′:j′≺ij
xj′=i
pij′
)k+1 − ( ∑
j′:j′≺ij
xj′=i
pij′
)k+1 ≤ (pi∗j + ∑
j′:j′≺i∗j
xj′=i∗
pi∗j′
)k+1 − ( ∑
j′:j′≺i∗j
xj′=i∗
pi∗j′
)k+1
≤
(
pi∗j + L(x(i
∗))
)k+1 − (L(x(i∗)))k+1 ≤ (k + 1)pi∗j(pi∗j + L(x(i∗)))k (7)
where the second inequality is due to the fact that (z+a)k+1−zk+1 is an increasing in z (for a > 0)
and
∑
j′:j′≺ij
xj′=i∗
pi∗j′ ≤ L(x(i∗)); the third inequality is due to Lemma 2.2 (by dividing both sides by
(pi∗j + L(x(i
∗)))k+1 and applying z = pi∗jpi∗j+L(x(i∗)) in the statement of Lemma 2.2). Therefore,
m∑
i=1
Lk+1(x(i)) =
m∑
i=1
∑
j:xj=i
qjc
k
j (x) ≤
m∑
i=1
∑
j:xj=i
qjc
k
j (x−j , x
∗
j )
≤
m∑
i=1
∑
j:x∗j=i
(k + 1)pij
(
pij + L(x(i))
)k+1 ≤ (k + 1) m∑
i=1
L(x∗(i))
(
L(x(i)) + L(x∗(i))
)k
≤ (k + 1)
m∑
i=1
k
(k + 1)2
Lk+1(x(i)) +O
(
αkkk−1
)
Lk+1(x∗(i))
where the first inequality is because x is an equilibrium; the second inequality is due to the sum
of Inequality (7) taken over all jobs j; and the fourth inequality is due to case (1b) of Lemma 2.1.
Arranging the terms, the lemma follows. 
Theorem 4.3 The PoA of the game under policy Balance is at most O(logm) by choosing k =
logm.
Proof Let y∗ be an optimal assignment and x∗ be an m-efficient assignment with property of
Lemma 4.1. Let x be an equilibrium. Remark that x is a m-efficient assignment since every job
can always get a bounded cost. Consider a job j assigned to machine i in profile x. As x is a
m-efficient assignment, by the definition of the policy Balance
ckj (x) =
1
qj
[(
pij +
∑
j′:j′≺ij
xj′=i
pij′
)k+1 − ( ∑
j′:j′≺ij
xj′=i
pij′
)k+1]
≤ 1
qj
[(
L(x(i))
)k+1 − (L(x(i))− pij)k+1]≤ (k + 1)ρijLk(x(i))
where the first inequality is because function (a+x)k+1−xk+1 is increasing; and the last inequality
is due to Lemma 2.2 (by dividing both sides by Lk+1(x(i)) and applying z =
pij
L(x(i)) in the statement
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of Lemma 2.2). Moreover, by Lemma 4.5, we have
Lk+1(x) ≤
m∑
i=1
Lk+1(x(i)) ≤ O(αkkk+1)
m∑
i=1
Lk+1(x∗(i)) ≤ O(αkkk+1m)Lk+1(x∗)
for some constant α. Therefore,
C(x) = max
j
cj(x) ≤ max
i,j
(
(k + 1)ρij
)1/k
L(x(i)) ≤
(
(k + 1)m
)1/k
L(x)
≤ O
((
kk+2m2
)1/k)
L(x∗) ≤ O
((
kk+2m2
)1/k)
L(y∗)
where the last inequality is due to Lemma 4.1. Choosing k = logm, the theorem follows. 
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APPENDIX
2 Smooth inequalities
Before proving Lemma 2.4, we need to show the following lemma. The technique is similar to the
proof of Lemma 2.3.
Lemma 2.1 For any non-negative sequences (ni)
P
i=1, (mi)
P
i=1, and for any positive increasing se-
quence (qi)
P
i=1, define Ai := n1q1 + . . . + ni−1qi−1 + niqi and Bi := m1q1 + . . . + mi−1qi−1 + miqi
for 1 ≤ i ≤ P . Then, it holds that
P∑
i=1
mi(Ai +miqi)
k ≤ µk
P∑
i=1
niA
k
i + λk
P∑
i=1
miB
k
i
where µk =
k+1
k+2 , λk = Θ(α
k(k + 1)k) for some constant α.
Proof Denote rj = 1/qj , aj = njqj and bj = mjqj for 1 ≤ j ≤ P . So Ai =
∑i
j=1 aj , Bi =
∑i
j=1 bj .
The inequality is equivalent to
P∑
i=1
ribi(Ai + bi)
k ≤ µk
P∑
i=1
riaiA
k
i + λk
P∑
i=1
ribiB
k
i
For convenience we set rP+1 = 0. The inequality could be written as
P∑
i=1
(ri − ri+1)
i∑
j=1
bj(Aj + bj)
k ≤
P∑
i=1
(ri − ri+1)
µk i∑
j=1
ajA
k
j + λk
i∑
j=1
bjB
k
j

As (ri)
P
i=1 is a decreasing sequence (e.g. ri − ri+1 ≥ 0 ∀1 ≤ i ≤ P ), it is sufficient to prove that
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ P ,
i∑
j=1
bj(Aj + bj)
k ≤
µk i∑
j=1
ajA
k
j + λk
i∑
j=1
bjB
k
j
 (8)
It remains to show Inequality (8).
By Lemma 2.2, we have (k+ 1)ajA
k
j ≥ Ak+1j − (Aj − aj)k+1 (since dividing both sides by Ak+1j ,
we obtain the inequality in Lemma 2.2 for z = aj/Aj). Therefore,
(k + 1)
i∑
j=1
ajA
k
j ≥
i∑
j=1
[
Ak+1j − (Aj − aj)k+1
]
= Ak+1i − (A1 − a1)k+1 = Ak+1i
since Aj = Aj+1 − aj+1 for all 1 ≤ j ≤ i − 1 and A1 = a1. Similarly, (k + 1)
∑i
j=1 ajB
k
j ≥ Bk+1i .
Thus, to prove inequality (8), it is sufficient to prove that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ P ,
i∑
j=1
bj(Aj + bj)
k ≤
(
µk
k + 1
Ak+1i +
λk
k + 1
Bk+1i
)
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Observe that
i∑
j=1
bj(Aj + bj)
k ≤
i∑
j=1
bj(Ai +Bi)
k ≤ Bi(Ai +Bi)k
Hence, we only need to argue that
Bi(Ai +Bi)
k ≤
(
µk
k + 1
Ak+1i +
λk
k + 1
Bk+1i
)
(9)
Choose µk =
k+1
k+2 and apply case (1b) of Lemma 2.1 (now a(k) =
(k+1)
k(k+2) and (k − 1)a(k) is
bounded by a constant), we deduce that by λk = Θ(α
k(k+ 1)k) for a constant α, the Inequality (9)
holds. 
Lemma 2.2 For any non-negative sequences (ni)
P
i=1, (mi)
P
i=1, and for any positive increasing se-
quence (qi)
P
i=1, define Ai = n1q1+ . . .+ni−1qi−1+(ni+ . . .+nP )qi and Bi = m1q1+ . . .+mi−1qi−1+
(mi + . . .+mP )qi for 1 ≤ i ≤ P . Then, it holds that
P∑
i=1
mi(Ai +miqi)
k ≤ µk
P∑
i=1
niA
k
i + λk
P∑
i=1
miB
k
i
where µk =
k+1
k+2 , λk = Θ(α
k2(k+1)
2
) for some constant α.
Proof Let A
(1)
i = n1q1+. . .+ni−1qi−1+niqi, A
(2)
i = (ni+. . .+nP ) andB
(1)
i = m1q1+. . .+mi−1qi−1+
miqi, B
(2)
i = (mi + . . . + mP ) for 1 ≤ i ≤ P . So, by definition we have A(1)i ≤ Ai, A(2)i ≤ Ai and
Ai ≤ A(1)i + A(2)i qi for 1 ≤ i ≤ N . Similarly, B(1)i ≤ Bi, B(2)i ≤ Bi and Bi ≤ B(1)i + B(2)i qi for
1 ≤ i ≤ P . By convention, let A(1)0 = B(1)0 = 0.
Thus, we have, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ P ,
(Ai +miqi)
k ≤
[(
A
(1)
i +miqi
)
+ qi
(
A
(2)
i +mi
)]k ≤ 2k [(A(1)i +miqi)k + qki (A(2)i +mi)k]
and (
A
(1)
i
)k
+ qki
(
A
(2)
i
)k ≤ 2Aki , (B(1)i )k + qki (B(2)i )k ≤ 2Bki .
Therefore, to prove the lemma, it is sufficient to argue that
2k
P∑
i=1
mi
(
A
(1)
i +miqi
)k ≤ µk
2
P∑
i=1
ni
(
A
(1)
i
)k
+
λk
2
P∑
i=1
mi
(
B
(1)
i
)k
(10)
and
2k
P∑
i=1
qkimi
(
A
(2)
i +mi
)k ≤ µk
2
P∑
i=1
qki ni
(
A
(2)
i
)k
+
λk
2
P∑
i=1
qkimi
(
B
(2)
i
)k
(11)
Inequality (10) holds for µk =
k+1
k+2 and λk = Θ(α
k2(k+1)
2
) for some constant α (the proof is
similar to that of Lemma 2.1 but in the end, the case (1c) of Lemma 2.1 is used to derive the value
of λk).
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Consider inequality (11). For convenience set q0 = 0. The inequality could be rewritten as
2k
P∑
i=1
(qki − qki−1)
P∑
j=i
mj
(
A
(2)
j +mj
)k
≤ µk
2
P∑
i=1
(qki − qki−1)
P∑
j=i
nj
(
A
(2)
j
)k
+
λk
2
P∑
i=1
(qki − qki−1)
P∑
j=i
mj
(
B
(2)
j
)k
As the sequence (qi)
P
i=1 is increasing, it is sufficient to prove that
2k
P∑
j=i
mj
(
A
(2)
j +mj
)k ≤ µk
2
P∑
j=i
nj
(
A
(2)
j
)k
+
λk
2
P∑
j=i
mj
(
B
(2)
j
)k
(12)
The inequality above could be considered as a corollary of Inequality (10) by rewriting the indices
in backward (i 7→ P + 1 − i) and considering the sequence qi = 1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ P . Precisely, fix an
index i and applying Inequality (10) for the sequence qj = 1 for 1 ≤ j ≤ P +1−i and two sequences
(n′j)
P+1−i
j=1 , and (m
′
j)
P+1−i
j=1 defined as n
′
j = nP+1−j and m
′
i = mP+1−j for all 1 ≤ j ≤ P + 1− i.
2k
P+1−i∑
j=1
m′j
((
j∑
t=1
n′t
)
+m′j
)k
≤ µk
2
P+1−i∑
j=1
n′j
(
j∑
t=1
n′t
)k
+
λk
2
P∑
j=1
m′j
(
j∑
t=1
m′t
)k
Replacing n′j by nj and m
′
j by mj for 1 ≤ j ≤ P + 1− i, we get Inequality (12). 
3 `k-norms of Completion Times
Lemma 3.1 For any A ≥ 0, p > 0 and k,N integer, it holds that
(k + 1)
N∑
t=1
(A+ tp)k ≥ N(A+Np)k
Proof First, for all 0 ≤ h ≤ k we have
N∑
t=1
th = Nh+1
N∑
t=1
(
t
N
)h 1
N
≥ Nh+1
∫ 1
0
xhdx =
Nh+1
h+ 1
where the inequality is because the function xh is increasing. Thus, (k+ 1)
∑N
t=1 t
h ≥ Nh+1 for all
0 ≤ h ≤ k. Therefore,(
k
h
)
Ak−hph(k + 1)
N∑
t=1
th ≥
(
k
h
)
Nh+1Ak−hph ∀0 ≤ h ≤ k
Summing the inequalities over 0 ≤ h ≤ k, we obtain
(k + 1)
N∑
t=1
(A+ tp)k =
k∑
h=0
(
k
h
)
Ak−hph(k + 1)
N∑
t=1
th ≥
k∑
h=0
(
k
h
)
Nh+1Ak−hph = N(A+Np)k

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Lemma 3.2 Let x be an assignment of jobs to machines. Then, the SPT policy minimizes the `k-
norm of job completion times with respect to this assignment among all feasible policies. Moreover,
the EQUI policy induces an objective value at most (2k + 2)1/k times higher.
Proof Consider a machine i and let N be the number of jobs assigned to i by the profile x.
These N jobs are renamed in increasing order of processing times, and since we fixed machine i,
for convenience we drop index i in the processing times. So we denote the N processing times as
p1 ≤ p2 ≤ . . . ≤ pN . In any schedule of those jobs, there exist distinct jobs with completion times
at least p1, p1 + p2, . . . , p1 + . . . + ph. Hence, the `k-norm on the completion times of such jobs is
at least
(∑h
j=1(p1 + . . .+ pj)
k
)1/k
, which is attained by the SPT policy.
These jobs are partitioned into different classes where jobs in the same class have the same
processing time, i.e., there are n1, . . . , nh jobs with processing times q1, . . . , qh. In the following, we
will prove by induction on the number of classes (i.e parameter h) that the objective value induced
by EQUI policy is within (2k + 2)1/k times the one induced by SPT, or that is,
(2k + 2)
h∑
j=1
N∑
t=1
(n0q0 + . . .+ nj−1qj−1 + t · qj)k
≥ 2
h∑
j=1
nj
(
n0q0 + n1q1 + . . .+ nj−1qj−1 + (nj + . . .+ nh)qj
)k
(13)
where for convenience we denote n0 = 0 and q0 = 0.
Consider the basis case where all jobs have the same processing time (h = 1). When h = 1,
Inequality (13) is equivalent to
2(k + 1)qk1
n1∑
t=1
tk ≥ nk+11 qk1
which is straightforward by Lemma 3.1.
Now, assume that Inequality (13) holds for h classes of jobs. We will prove that this statement
also holds for (h+ 1) classes.
Define function q(z) := qh + (qh+1 − qh)z for 0 ≤ z ≤ 1. Then, all jobs with processing time
qh+1 could be seen as having processing time q(1). Define g(z) := 2(k + 1)
∑nh+1
t=1 (A+ t · q(z))k −
nh+1(A+ nh+1q(z))
k where A =
∑nh
j=0 njqj . Consider function f(z) as follows:
f(z) = g(z) + 2(k + 1)
h∑
j=1
nj∑
t=1
(n0q0 + . . .+ nj−1qj−1 + t · qj)k
−
h∑
j=1
nj
(
n0q0 + n1q1 + . . .+ nj−1qj−1 + (nj + . . .+ nh+1)qj
)k
Inequality (13) is equivalent to prove that f(1) ≥ 0. By the induction hypothesis, we have f(0) ≥ 0
since for z = 0 there are exactly h classes in the inequality (13).
Consider the derivative of f(z).
f ′(z) = g′(z) = k(qh+1 − qh)
[
2(k + 1)
nh+1∑
t=1
t(A+ tq(z))k−1 − n2h+1(A+ nh+1q(z))k−1
]
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By Chebyshev sum inequality on two increasing sequences (t)nh1 and
(
(A+ tq(z))k−1
)nh
t=1
, we have:
2(k + 1)
nh+1∑
t=1
t(A+ tq(z))k−1 ≥ 2(k + 1)
nh+1
(nh+1∑
t=1
t
)
·
(nh+1∑
t=1
(A+ tq(z))k−1
)
> nh+1(k + 1)
nh+1∑
t=1
(A+ tq(z))k−1 > n2h+1(A+ nh+1q(z))
k−1
where the last inequality is due to Lemma 3.1. Thus, f ′(z) = g′(z) > 0. Hence, f(1) ≥ f(0) ≥ 0.

4 `∞-norms of Completion Times
4.1 Policy BCOORD, Revisited
Lemma 4.1 Let x and x∗ be an equilibrium and an arbitrary m-efficient profile, respectively. Then,
it holds that
∑
i
∑
j:xj=i
qjc
k
j (x) ≤ O
(
kαk
(
k
log k
)k−1)∑
i
∑
j:x∗j=i
qjc
k
j (x
∗) where α is a constant.
Proof Let j be an arbitrary job. Since x is an equilibrium, cj(x) ≤ cj(x−j , x∗j ), thus qjckj (x) ≤
qjc
k
j (x−j , x
∗
j ) for all jobs j. Using the smooth argument, in order to prove the lemma, it is sufficient
to argue that∑
i
∑
j:x∗j=i
qjc
k
j (x−j , x
∗
j ) ≤
k
k + 1
∑
i
∑
j:xj=i
qjc
k
j (x) +O
(
αk
(
k
log k
)k−1)∑
i
∑
j:x∗j=i
qjc
k
j (x
∗) (14)
for some constant α.
Applying Lemma 2.1(case (1a)), for any machine i we have
L(x∗(i)) (L(x(i)) + L(x∗(i)))k ≤ k
k + 1
Lk+1(x(i)) +O
(
αk
(
k
log k
)k−1)
Lk+1(x∗(i))
for some constant α. Moreover, by definition of BCOORD,
∑
j:x∗j=i
qjc
k
j (x−j , x
∗
j ) is upper bounded
by the right-hand side of the inequality above. Therefore, Inequality (14) follows. 
Theorem 4.2 ([3]) The PoA of the game under policy BCOORD is O
(
logm
log logm
)
by choosing k =
logm.
Proof Let y∗ be an optimal assignment and x∗ be an m-efficient assignment with property of
Lemma 4.1. Then, for any Nash equilibrium x, we have
Lk+1(x) ≤
∑
i
∑
j:xj=i
qjc
k
j (x) ≤ O
(
kαk
(
k
log k
)k−1)∑
i
∑
j:x∗j=i
qjc
k
j (x
∗)
≤ O
(
kαk
(
k
log k
)k−1)
·mLk+1(x∗)
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Therefore, C(x) ≤ m1/kL(x) ≤ O
(
m2/k · klog k
)
L(x∗) ≤ O
(
m2/k · klog k
)
L(y∗). Choosing k =
logm, the theorem follows. 
4.2 Policy CCOORD, Revisited
Lemma 4.2 ([3]) For any integer k ≥ 1, any finite set of non-negative reals A and any real b, the
following hold
(i) L(A)k ≤ Ψk(A) ≤ k!L(A)k
(ii) Ψk(A)
k+1 ≤ Ψk+1(A)k
(iii) Ψk(A ∪ {b}) = Ψk(A) + kbΨk−1(A ∪ {b})
(iv) Ψk(A) ≤ kL(A)Ψk−1(A)
In the following, we use also an inequality whose the proof is similar to the one in Lemma 2.1.
For all real positive numbers a, b, it holds that
bak ≤ 1
2(k + 1)
ak+1 +
2kkk
k + 1
bk+1 (15)
Lemma 4.3 Let x be a Nash equilibrium. Then, for any m-efficient profile x∗, it holds that∑
i
∑
j:xj=i
qjc
k
j (x) ≤ 2k+1(k + 1)k+2
∑
i
∑
j:x∗j=i
qjc
k
j (x
∗)
Proof We will define recursively two sequences (µk)k≥1 and (λk)k≥1 such that λk1−µk ≤ 2k+1(k+1)k+2
and the following inequalities hold for every integer k and every machine i∑
j:x∗j=i
pijΨk(x(i) ∪ {j}) ≤ µk
k
Ψk+1(x(i)) +
λk
k
Ψk+1(x
∗(i)) (16)
If Inequality (16) holds, then we deduce that∑
j:x∗j=i
qjc
k
j (x−j , x
∗
j ) =
∑
j:x∗j=i
pijΨk(x(i) ∪ {j}) ≤ µk
k
Ψk+1(x(i)) +
λk
k
Ψk+1(x
∗(i))
≤ µkL(x(i))Ψk(x(i)) + λkL(x∗(i))Ψk(x∗(i)) = µk
∑
j:xj=i
qjc
k
j (x) + λk
∑
j:x∗j=i
qjc
k
j (x
∗)
where the second inequality is due to Lemma 4.2(iv). Using the smooth argument, the lemma
follows. In the following, we recursively define the sequences (µk)k≥1 and (λk)k≥1 with the required
properties.
For the base case where k = 1, Inequality (16) becomes
pijL(x(i) ∪ {j}) ≤ µ1Ψ2(x(i)) + λ1Ψ2(x∗(i))
The left-handside is upper-bounded by L(x(i))L(x∗(i))+L2(x∗(i)). Since
(
L(x(i))
2 − L(x∗(i)
)2
> 0,
by computation we have L(x(i))L(x∗(i)) + L2(x∗(i)) ≤ 1/4L2(x(i)) + 2L2(x∗(i)). So, by applying
Lemma 4.2(i) we obtain
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∑
j:x∗j=i
pijΨk(x(i) ∪ {j}) ≤ 1/4L2(x(i)) + 2L2(x∗(i)) ≤ 1/4Ψ2(x(i)) + 2Ψ2(x∗(i))
Choosing µ1 = 1/4 and λ1 = 2, Inequality (16) follows.
Suppose the two sequences have been defined until k − 1. We have∑
j:x∗j=i
pijΨk(x(i) ∪ {j}) =
∑
j:x∗j=i
pijΨk(x(i)) + pijkpijΨk−1(x(i) ∪ {j})
≤ L(x∗(i))Ψk(x(i)) + kL(x∗(i))
∑
j:x∗j=i
pijΨk−1(x(i) ∪ {j})
≤ L(x∗(i))Ψk(x(i)) + k
k − 1L(x
∗(i)) [µk−1Ψk(x(i)) + λk−1Ψk(x∗(i))]
≤
(
1 +
kµk−1
k − 1
)
L(x∗(i))Ψk(x(i)) +
kλk−1
k − 1 L(x
∗(i))Ψk(x∗(i))
≤ kµk−1 + k − 1
k − 1
[
1
2(k + 1)
Ψk(x(i))
k+1
k +
2kkk
k + 1
Lk+1(x∗(i))
]
+
kλk−1
k − 1 L(x
∗(i))Ψk(x∗(i))
≤ kµk−1 + k − 1
2(k − 1)(k + 1)Ψk+1(x(i)) +
(
kλk−1
k − 1 +
(kµk−1 + k − 1)2kkk
(k + 1)(k − 1)
)
Ψk+1(x
∗(i))
where the equality is due to Lemma 4.2(iii); the second inequality is due to the induction hypothesis;
the fourth one is by applying inequality (15) for L(x∗(i)) and Ψk(x(i))1/k; and the last inequality
is due to parts (i) and (ii) of Lemma 4.2 (for any set A of non-negative reals, Ψk+1(A) ≥ Ψk(A) ·
Ψk(A)
1/k ≥ Ψk(A)L(A)).
Choosing the sequences µk = k/(k + 1) and λk = 2
k+1kk+1 for k ≥ 2. The sequences satisfy:
µk
k
=
kµk−1 + k − 1
2(k − 1)(k + 1)
λk
k
≥ kλk−1
k − 1 +
(kµk−1 + k − 1)2kkk
(k + 1)(k − 1)
λk
1− µk ≤ 2
k+1(k + 1)k+2
Hence, the lemma follows. 
Theorem 4.4 ([3]) The PoA of the game under policy CCOORD is O(log2m) by choosing k =
logm.
Proof Let y∗ be an optimal assignment and x∗ be an m-efficient assignment with property of
Lemma 4.1. Then, for any Nash equilibrium x, we have
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L(x) max
i
Ψk(x(i)) ≤
∑
i
L(x(i))Ψk(x(i)) =
∑
i
∑
j:xj=i
qjc
k
j (x)
≤ 2k+1(k + 1)k+2
∑
i
∑
j:x∗j=i
qjc
k
j (x
∗) = 2k+1(k + 1)k+2
∑
i
L(x∗(i))Ψk(x∗(i))
≤ 2k+1(k + 1)k+2k!
∑
i
L(x∗(i))k+1
≤ 2k+1(k + 1)k+2k!mLk+1(x∗) ≤ 4k+1(k + 1)k+2k!mLk+1(y∗)
where the second and the third inequalities are due to Lemma 4.3 and Lemma 4.2(i). Therefore,
maxi Ψk(x(i)) ≤ 4k+1(k + 1)k+2k!mLk+1(y∗) since L(x) ≥ L(y∗).
Hence, C(x) ≤ m1/k maxi Ψ(x(i))1/k ≤ O
(
(m2k!)1/k(k + 1)(k+2)/k
)
L(x∗). Choosing k =
logm− 1, the theorem follows. 
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